The EU is engaged in an ambitious, controversial, and high-stakes 
Introduction
In the area of climate change, the EU is currently engaged in a strategy of 'contin gent unilateralism'. Contingent unilateralism consists of two key components. First, it involves the application of EU climate change law to greenhouse gas emissions that are generated abroad. Secondly, it renders this geographical extension contingent in the sense that the EU may agree to waive the external application of its climate change law if adequate international or third country climate change regulation has been put 470 EJIL 23 (2012), in place. 1 The phenomenon of contingent unilateralism is most apparent in the EU framework governing the emissions trading scheme (ETS). 2 While this article focuses primarily on the EU's decision to include aviation in the ETS, it is important to be aware that this decision forms part of a broader trend. Thus, arguments articulated in the context of the aviation example may have implications elsewhere. The EU's strategy of contingent unilateralism should also be viewed against the backdrop of the concept of a climate change 'regime complex'. 3 This concept cap tures the idea that in the absence of a comprehensive, multilateral framework for reg ulating climate change, global action on climate change is emerging in a fragmented manner, on the basis of action by private parties as well as by many national and inter national organizations, and states. It is important to keep this concept in mind when we consider the extent to which principles that find expression in multilateral climate change agreements should be considered as relevant in giving shape to the 'bits and pieces' that, for the time being at least, make up the climate change governance whole.
Contingent Unilateralism and the ETS
There are four examples of contingent unilateralism embedded in the framework gov erning the EU's emissions trading scheme. In relation to the first two examples, the EU has already decided to pursue this approach. In relation to the third and fourth examples, the EU is contemplating an approach of this kind.
The first example, and the one that forms the main point of reference for this art icle, is the EU's decision to include aviation emissions in its emissions trading scheme. 4 Subject to limited exceptions, all flights taking off from or landing at an EU airport are covered by the scheme. 5 For ETScovered flights, operators are required to surrender emission allowances for each tonne of carbon dioxide generated during the relevant flight. 6 This includes emissions that are generated outside EU airspace, and conse quently airlines will be obliged to surrender emission allowances also for those parts 1 In EU scholarship and policy discussions, the concept of a 'third country' is frequently used. Although its meaning is not immediately apparent, it has become a useful shorthand to refer to countries which are not Member States of the EU. For the sake of convenience, we will use this terminology here. See Annex I to the consolidated version of Dir. 2003/87, supra note 2, for a list of these exceptions. 6 A penalty of €100 per tonne of carbon dioxide will be incurred by airlines that fail to surrender the nec essary allowances. The operator will still be required to surrender allowances to cover those emissions the following year. Where an operator fails to comply with the requirements of the directive and where other enforcement measures have failed, an operating ban may be imposed by the Commission on the airline concerned. See Art. 16(3) and (5)-(9) of the consolidated version of Dir. 2003/87, supra note 2.
Secondly, from the start of 2013 the EU will prohibit the use of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from new Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in the ETS, 11 except in so far as these projects are either situated in LeastDeveloped Countries (LDCs) or originate in a country that has concluded an agreement with the EU regu lating CERs' level of use. 12 CERs are a form of carbon offset that can be used to contrib ute to achieving compliance with a Member State's or a company's obligations under the ETS. From 2013, their 'importation' will be prohibited, other than from LDCs, unless an international agreement or a bilateral agreement regulating the conditions governing their 'production' has been put in place.
Thirdly, the recently revised Emissions Trading Directive creates a legal frame work that provides for the possible inclusion in the ETS of imported products in energyintensive sectors that are deemed to be exposed to significant risks of carbon that an international agreement on climate change is concluded. This Article puts in place a framework for moving towards a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism which could operate on the basis of an emissions baseline that is more ambitious than that represented by a business as usual approach.
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EJIL 23 (2012), 469-494 leakage. 13 In determining whether to include imported energyintensive products in the ETS, the Commission is required to take into account the existence of 'binding sectoral agreements which lead to global greenhouse gas emission reductions of the magnitude required to effectively address climate change'.
14 While the EU has so far desisted from extending the application of the ETS to imported products in any of the sectors concerned, it is significant that a legal framework countenancing an exten sion of this kind has been put in place. 15 Finally, the EU is currently consulting on the possible inclusion of maritime trans port in the ETS. 16 This consultation builds upon the statement in the preamble to the revised Emissions Trading Directive that unless the international community has approved an agreement by the end of 2011 that includes international maritime emissions in its reduction targets, the Commission should put forward a proposal to include these emissions in the European scheme. 17 A Commission 'Roadmap' on mea sures to include maritime transport in the ETS suggests that all ships visiting EU and EEA ports would be included. 18 Though conditions for the exemption of individual ships have not yet been defined, it is apparent that EU action is contingent upon there not being an adequate global agreement in place.
In each of these examples, EU climate unilateralism is contingent rather than abso lute. The geographical extension, or the externalization, of the ETS can be avoided if the goods or services are subject to adequate climate change regulation, internation ally or on the part of other states. The EU may be thought to be acting as a 'norm entrepreneur', using (the threat of) unilateral action to stimulate climate action 13 See Art. 10b(1)(b) of the consolidated version of Dir. 2003/87, supra note 2. Carbon leakage occurs when there is an increase in emissions in one country as a result of steps taken to reduce emissions in another country. The EU Emissions Trading Directive includes a threshold for assessing whether a sector or sub sector is exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. This is based on calculating ETSdriven increases in production costs and intensity of trade with third countries. See Art. 10a(14)-(17). elsewhere. 19 The contingency that characterizes EU climate unilateralism is key to understanding and evaluating the EU's approach. We will explore the concept of con tingent unilateralism by looking at the aviation example in more depth.
We have chosen to focus on this example because it is already enshrined in EU legis lation and the aviation extension has recently taken effect. The EU's Aviation Directive has already formed the subject matter of an unsuccessful action for judicial review, 20 and it has provoked many strong reactions, both in favour and against. 21 While a number of nongovernmental organizations have expressed strong and active sup port, 22 a significant number of third countries have joined together to express their objections and to consider what kinds of retaliatory action they may take. 23 In a radi cal role reversal, the US House of Representatives has passed a bill to resist the applica tion of the EU measure in the United States. 24 This prohibits US aircraft operators from participating in the ETS, and instructs US officials to negotiate or take any action nec essary to ensure US aviation operators are not penalized by any unilaterally imposed EU scheme. In keeping with the primary theme of this article, the China Air Transport Association has condemned the EU scheme as contrary to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 25 and India has levelled a similar charge. 27 These emissions are unregulated at the international level. While for developed countries domestic aviation emissions are counted towards their Kyoto Protocol targets, international aviation emissions are not. There is not even a settled framework at the international level for assigning responsibility for interna tional aviation emissions to specific states.
The Kyoto Protocol provides that developed countries shall pursue the limitation or reduction of international aviation emissions working through the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO). 28 Progress in ICAO has, however, been exceedingly slow. While ICAO recently endorsed an 'aspirational goal' of annual fuel efficiency improve ments in aviation of 2 per cent, no binding targets or objectives have yet been set.
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It is against this backdrop of global regulatory inertia that the EU's Aviation Directive should be viewed. Because it applies not only to intraEU flights, but also to international flights arriving in and departing from the EU, the ETS has the poten tial to cover almost 60 per cent of international aviation emissions. It has been sug gested that the Aviation Directive will lead to CO 2 emission reductions of 183 million tonnes in 2020, 30 and that the cost for airlines could be around €10.4 billion from 2012-2020. 31 By including aviation in the ETS, the EU has adopted a unilateral measure of far reaching significance. This is in part because the EU, acting unilaterally, has defined the geographical reach of its emissions trading scheme. It is also in part because the EU has asserted the privilege of determining unilaterally when, and on what basis, third 27 While the EU will consult with the third country concerned, and while it will continue to negotiate on a multilateral basis within ICAO, ultimately it is for the EU to determine what is to count as 'good enough' when measures to tackle the climate change impact of aviation are agreed or adopted elsewhere. The unilateral nature of the EU's Aviation Directive is reinforced in another, more subtle, way. In deciding which flights to include, the EU is required to make a unilateral determination as to the 'system boundary' that should apply to international avia tion emissions. 33 In the absence of any international agreement on this point, the EU has settled upon a framework that allocates responsibility for aviation emissions to the departure state. Where the departure state fails to take responsibility for regula tion aviation emissions, by adopting measures to reduce the climate change impact of these flights, the EU as the arrival state has asserted the right to step in. It is because of the way that the EU has chosen to draw the system boundary for aviation that its decision has proven to be so controversial.
The dominant system boundary in the global regulation of greenhouse gas emis sions is productionbased. 34 This allocates responsibility for emissions to the state in which the emissions are generated or produced. If emissions are generated as a result of producing steel in China, it is China that incurs responsibility for these regardless of where the steel is consumed. The influence of this productionbased system boundary is apparent in the assertion that the EU's aviation decision is 'extraterritorial'. Viewed through the lens of a productionbased system boundary, which posits the place in which the emissions are generated as the relevant territorial connecting factor, the EU's Aviation Directive adopts an extraterritorial approach.
However, as is already clear, the EU has, rightly, 35 rejected a productionbased system boundary for aviation in favour of an alternative approach. While the EU's alternative does not eschew territoriality, it insists upon the relevance of a different territorial factor from that privileged by the dominant productionbased approach. The territorial connecting factor to which the EU attaches importance is market access, be it for departing or landing flights. Only flights that depart from or land at 32 In order to exempt flights departing from a particular third country, the Commission will be required to act on the basis of a regulatory committee with scrutiny procedure. Thus the Commission will be overseen by a committee comprising Member States' representatives and a decision proposed by the Commission may be blocked by either the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers: see Art. 25a(1) of the con solidated version of Dir. 2003/87, supra note 2. Art. 25a(2) of the same directive goes on to provide that if an agreement on global measures to reduce international aviation emissions is achieved, the Commission shall consider whether amendments to the directive are required. Any amendments would have to be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 192(2) TFEU. 33 The idea of a systemboundary in this setting is drawn from Peters, 'From ProductionBased to ConsumptionBased National Emission Inventories', 65 Ecological Economics (2008) 13. 34 This is by no means uncontested. There is increasing pressure to integrate an element of consumption based accounting into climate change. See, e.g., Davis and Caldeira, 'Consumptionbased Accounting of CO2 Emissions', 107 Proc Nat'l Acad Sciences (2010) 5687. 35 It is readily apparent that a productionbased system boundary is not adequate in relation to aviation as many emissions are generated in areas which are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state, e.g., over the High Seas.
EJIL 23 (2012), an EU airport will be covered by the emissions trading scheme. The Aviation Directive may be extraterritorial when viewed through the lens of a productionbased system boundary. However, it is merely differently territorial when it is viewed through a sys tem boundary that posits market access (place of arrival or departure) as the key.
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By contrast to some of these observers, we are not willing to condemn the EU on the basis that its Aviation Directive is unilateral or, from one perspective, extraterritor ial. In a policy domain that is unregulated internationally, the EU is using its market power to prevent regulatory 'liftoff ' and to achieve 'juridical touchdown'. 37 It is doing so in a policy domain in which 'domestic' EU regulation can achieve substantial global reach, and in a way that may encourage similar climate action initiatives elsewhere. We are, however, critical of the EU's approach in one important respect. We consider that the Aviation Directive fails to reflect adequately the demands of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC). It is to this principle and to its role and relevance in the context of the Aviation Directive that we will turn now.
The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) lies at the heart of the international compact on climate change. It is artic ulated in Article 3 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 38 and reiterated in numerous decisions taken by parties, 39 including the decision launching the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol.
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The CBDRRC principle establishes a common responsibility among states for protect ing the climate system, but sanctions, in light of pervasive differences between states in their contributions to the stock of global greenhouse gases (GHG) and their economic capabilities, differences among states in their efforts to address climate change. It is 36 Neither Kokott AG nor the ECJ accepted that the EU measure is extraterritorial. See supra note 20. The ECJ observed at para. 125 that the Aviation Directive does not infringe the principle of territoriality because the aircraft covered are physically present in the territory of one of the EU Member States. It also stressed (para. 129) that the EU can take steps to regulate within its territory even where the activity causing effects within its territory originates in an event that occurs partly outside. This is a crucial point. It reminds us that from the perspective of the EU, the fact that a flight lands in or takes off from an EU airport is relevant not only from the point of view of its enforcement jurisdiction, but from the point of view of its legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction as well. at New York University School of Law on July 9, 2012
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ worth noting that the CBDRRC principle takes into account both current and historic contributions to the stock of global greenhouse gases. This is evident from preambular recitals to the FCCC that recognize, inter alia, that the 'largest share of historical and cur rent global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions origi nating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs'.
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Although the CBDRRC principle has come to play a pivotal role in international envi ronmental law, the core content of the CBDRRC principle, as well as the nature of the obligation it entails, is deeply contested. There are differing views on whether the basis for differentiation lies in differences in the level of economic development and capabili ties, in contributions to GHGs in the atmosphere, or both. We would argue that it refers to both. If CBDRRC refers to differentiation based on capability alone the use of the term 'respective capabilities' would be superfluous. It follows that FCCC Article 3 is intended to highlight differentiation based on two markers of differentiation -one based on capability, and the other, drawing from Rio Principle 7 which contains the authoritative definition of CBDR, 42 based on contribution to global environmental harm. There are also disagreements as to the nature of the obligation the CBDRRC prin ciple entails. While some argue that it obliges states to act in particular ways, others contend that it is merely a consideration that should be taken into account in the deci sionmaking process. The disagreements over this principle's content and the nature of the obligation it entails have spawned debates over its legal status. 43 It is our con tention that even if this principle does not assume the character of a legal obligation in itself, it is a fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime, such that it forms the basis for the interpretation of existing obligations and the elaboration of future international legal obligations within the regime in question. Indeed, it is arguable that any future legal regime must be consistent with the CBDRRC principle in order to meet the requirements of the Convention, as well as the duties to perform and interpret a treaty in good faith. The fact that it is a fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime also implies, in our view, that state parties are obliged not just to interpret current obligations and fashion new ones in keeping with the CBDRRC principle, but also to take this principle into account in their unilateral actions vis-à-vis other parties.
Admittedly, there are and will be difficulties in applying this principle. Given the divergent interpretations of the CBDRRC principle it is unclear what this principle requires, and how parties are to apply it. 44 But these difficulties, we argue, are not 56 However, it is not differentiation more generally or the CBDRRC principle that is in disfavour, but the particular variant of it found in the Kyoto Protocol. The CBDRRC principle and most forms of differentiation are still in play, and will remain central to the future climate regime.
Also of relevance to an examination of the EU's Aviation Directive is a corollary to the CBDRRC principle, FCCC Article 4(7), which notes that 'the extent to which devel oping countries will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology, and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties'. This suggests not just that developing country mitigation actions are depend ent on developed country actions on finance and technology, but also that the flow of finance is expected to be from developed to developing countries. 57 It is perhaps in keeping with this notion that fleshes out the CBDRRC principle that the Secretary General's High Level Advisory Group on Climate Finance arrived at the criterion of 'no net incidence' on developing countries in evaluating sources and instruments to raise climate finance.
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It is against this backdrop of the CBDRRC principle and related provisions in the climate regime that the EU's Aviation Directive must be examined. principle of CBDRRC, 59 the Commission has argued more recently that the principle does not apply. 60 The Commission argues that this principle applies to states and to the climate measures they take, while the ETS applies only to businesses active in the EU market and not to states. We will begin by considering the validity of the EU's argu ment that in this setting the principle of CBDRRC does not apply.
It is our view that the EU's argument about the nonapplication of CBDRRC rests upon a characterization of the Aviation Directive that fails to capture its full extent. While the directive does apply to airlines active within the EU market, requiring them to surrender allowances as set out above, it also 'applies' to states. It does so because the application of the directive to a business (an airline) depends in part upon the behaviour of the airline's home state. Where a third country adopts climate mitiga tion measures that meet the EU's unilaterally imposed conditions, flights departing from this third country may be excluded from the ETS. The EU's Aviation Directive is consequently a developed country measure that makes demands both of EUactive businesses and of their home states. Thus, when the EU considers granting a partial exemption for incoming flights from the ETS, and when it evaluates the environmen tal effect of third country measures put in place, the principle of CBDRRC should cer tainly apply. This is a point to which we will return below.
Also, we do not accept that the principle of CBDRRC ceases to be relevant when the EU adopts unilateral climate change measures, even when these measures are directed at businesses that are active in the EU. Indeed, we argued above that this prin ciple forms a fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime and that parties have an obligation to take it into account. The premises under pinning the EU's claim to the contrary are far from clear. There is no suggestion that CBDRRC is not relevant when developing countries sign up to or adopt climate change measures that are directed at developing country businesses active in the market of the EU. CBDRRC also remains relevant in relation to developing country measures, even when these measures are sectorspecific rather than economywide. 61 Why then should EU sectorspecific measures be treated differently in this respect?
outcome to be presented to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its seventeenth session, FCCC/ AWGLCA/2011/CRP.38 (7 Dec. 2011), at 40, available at: unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/ eng/crp38.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2012). 59 Commission of the European Communities, 'Impact Assessment of the inclusion of aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community', SEC (2006) The EU's claim that CBDRRC does not apply in relation to the Aviation Directive seems to rest on the fact that the directive was adopted by the EU. It appears to be based on the identity of the actor enacting the measure as opposed to the material impact that the measure will have. When a developing country endorses a sectorspecific mitigation commitment, CBDRRC applies. When the EU uses market access as an instrument to 'encourage' sectorspecific greenhouse gas reductions, it is the EU's view that CBDRRC ceases to apply. While the EU has not explained why CBDRRC should not apply to uni lateral EU measures, its emphasis upon the fact that the Aviation Directive is directed at businesses that are active in the EU market gives some indication of its thinking and intent.
The EU's attempt to constrain the application of the principle of CBDRRC in rela tion to businesses active in the EU is driven by competitiveness concerns. The EU has been commendably open in acknowledging the importance of these concerns, and the role that they play in driving an equal treatment as opposed to a differentiation based approach. 62 These concerns are particularly pronounced against the backdrop of a Kyotostyle understanding of CBDRRC that would let even the richest 'developing' countries (and their airlines) entirely off the hook. We recognize the validity of these concerns. Nonetheless, in implementing its Aviation Directive it would have been open to the EU to adopt a more nuanced understanding of CBDRRC; one predicated upon differentiation between countries as opposed to crude differentiation between devel oped and developing country blocs. Also, as we explore below, it is possible to conceive of ways of incorporating respect for CBDRRC within the EU's Aviation Directive that are capable of accommodating competitiveness concerns.
B Does the EU's Aviation Directive Respect the Principle of CBDRRC?
What then of the argument put forward in the EU's Impact Assessment that the Aviation Directive is 'fully in line with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" under the UNFCCC'. 63 There are reasons to question this conclusion and the arguments that the Impact Assessment makes.
The EU's Aviation Directive applies both to businesses and to states. On the one hand, it takes the form of a unilateral decision to include airlines in the emissions trading scheme. On the other hand, this unilateral extension is contingent in the sense that a nonEU country can apply for an exemption for flights that depart from it where the country in question has itself taken adequate steps to reduce the climate change impact of flights. In the light of this, it is necessary to investigate whether the EU's Aviation Directive leaves any room for differential treatment of either developing country businesses or developing country states.
Turning first to the treatment of developing country airlines, it is clear that the Aviation Directive is premised on the equal treatment of all airlines, regardless of nationality. 64 All airlines whose activities fall within the scope of the ETS will incur 482 EJIL 23 (2012), 469-494 the same obligation in the form of a requirement to surrender one allowance for each tonne of carbon that they emit. The Aviation Directive does not provide for the dif ferential treatment of airlines, regardless of whether they come from China, the EU, or Ethiopia. When it comes to developing countries, as opposed to developing country airlines, the Aviation Directive is more ambiguous. Ultimately, the question whether the direc tive respects the principle of CBDRRC will depend upon how the conditions for exemp tion are interpreted and applied. Recall that for a nonEU country to gain exemption from the ETS for flights which depart from it, 65 the country in question must take measures to reduce the climate change impact of these flights. 66 This requirement is noticeably vague.
In its original proposal, the Commission suggested that an exemption for a nonEU country should be made conditional upon the adoption by it of measures which are at least equivalent to the requirements laid down in the Aviation Directive. 67 This refer ence to equivalence was dropped by the Council when it reached political agreement on the proposal, and the reference to equivalence does not appear in the Common Position adopted on 18 April 2008. 68 However, the final version of the directive does include a reference to equivalence in its preamble:
If a third country adopts measures, which have an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of this Directive, to reduce the climate impact of flights to the [EU], the Commission should consider the options available in order to provide for optimal interaction between the Community scheme and that country's measures, after consulting with that country. 69 Preambles included in EU legislation do not have binding legal force and they cannot serve as a ground for derogating from the main body of the relevant act. 70 Nonetheless, where there is no contradiction between the preamble and the main body of the direc tive, the preamble may be used to 'cast light on the interpretation to be given to a legal 65 There is no possibility for flights departing from the EU to be exempted from the scheme. As previously discussed, the EU's system boundary places primary responsibility for international aviation emissions on the departure state. The concept of equivalence can of course be understood in a number of differ ent ways. Equivalence may be evaluated on the basis of effort commensurate with resources, or on the basis of outcome regardless of the relative effort made. Nonetheless, the preamble to the directive may be thought to exhibit a preference for an outcome based approach. For an exemption to be made available, third country measures are required to achieve an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of the directive. In the light of this, while any final evaluation of the EU's Aviation Directive from the point of view of CBDRRC will depend upon how the criteria for exemption are inter preted and applied, the emphasis upon equivalence would seem to suggest that equal treatment, not differentiation, will be the guiding principle in this respect.
It is then our contention that the Aviation Directive is not consistent with the prin ciple of CBDRRC in respect of its application to businesses, and it is probably not con sistent in so far as it applies to states. Our conclusion regarding the compatibility of the EU's Aviation Directive with the principle of CBDRRC is not altered as a result of the arguments put forward in the EU's Impact Assessment. Nonetheless, these arguments will be considered below.
As previously noted, the Impact Assessment stressed that the Aviation Directive would be fully in line with the principle of CBDRRC. 73 Its first argument is very brief. It states simply that '[i]ncorporation of aviation emissions from routes to/from EU air ports into the EU ETS would first of all be a measure taken by the Community [EU] as an Annex I Party to the UNFCCC'. 74 This is in essence an argument that CBDRRC does not apply to a unilateral measure adopted by an Annex I party, even where that measure places demands on operators from developing countries and, ultimately, on developing countries themselves. This is an argument that we have discussed and rejected above.
The Impact Assessment goes on to stress that developed country airline operators will bear a larger proportion of the costs of complying with the Aviation Directive because of their relatively higher market share on EU-ETS covered routes. 75 Indeed, the economic impact on world regions that include developing countries is anticipated 71 Case 215/88, Casa Fleischhandel v. Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordung [1989] ECR 2789, at para. 31. The ECJ emphasized that nonetheless the preamble could not itself constitute a rule not contained in the main body of the legislation. Note that the reference to equivalence appears in other language versions of the dir. as well, including at least the French, Italian, Spanish, and German versions. 72 See Ms. Hedegaard's answer to a written question (P005387/2011 posed by Holger Krahmer) on avia tion in the European emissions trading scheme at: www.asdeurope.org/site/fileadmin/user_upload/ news/EU_news_150711a.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2012). Recall again though the ambiguity inherent in the current directive on this point. We will argue below that the EU should exploit the extra flexibility that the exclusion of equivalence from the main body of the directive provides. 73 Final Impact Assessment, supra note 59, at 52. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.
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EJIL 23 (2012), to be modest. 76 For example, the cost for African airlines is anticipated to be between €2 million and €35 million per year. 77 One estimate suggests that the cost to all air lines in 2012 could be as much as €1.125 billion. 78 We do not wish to deny that evidence of disparate impact is important, but equally we do not consider that it is sufficient to support the claim that the Aviation Directive is consistent with the principle of CBDRRC. This is because the burden imposed on air lines depends principally on the emissions they generate on ETScovered routes. In the language of CBDRRC, it is the scale of a country's current responsibility for emissions that is taken into account, while its historic responsibilities and relative economic capabilities are not. It is important to stress that there is no necessary correlation between current responsibility for emissions and these other factors that are relevant in giving effect to the principle of CBDRRC.
To illustrate this point: 98 ICAO states are currently not covered by the ETS, either because they do not have a commercial operator with flights to the EU or because they fall beneath the de minimis threshold laid down. 79 Nonetheless, 18 'lowcapability' countries have carriers included in the ETS.
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It is also the case that the correlation between a country's share of ETScovered emissions and its economic capability judged by relative GDP is rather hit and miss. 81 Thus, for example, South Korea produces the same volume of ETScovered emissions 76 Note that the analysis is based upon a scenario of including only EUdeparting flights in the ETS, whereas both departing and arriving flights have been included. 77 This would depend upon the volume of allowances to be auctioned and the price of allowances. The comparable figure for the Far East, which includes both China and Japan, was between €8 million and €151 million. 78 Here, Müller is using the concept of relative capability and defining it in terms of relative wealth as measured by GDP. Müller also introduces the concept of absolute capability which is determined by the overall size of the economy and the number of people with less than $2 per day. He argues that both types of capability should be viewed as relevant in operational izing the principle of CBDRRC. 81 For countrybycountry emissions shares see the Presentation by RungeMetzger, supra note 60, at 41.
For GDP see statistics on National Accounts (including GDP), available at: http://databank. worldbank. org/databank/download/GDP.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2012) for the country concerned. See also Müller, supra note 80, for a more detailed analysis of the correlation between the costs of complying with the Aviation Directive and CBDRRC. He points out that relatively small adjustments of up to 5.3% of the total economic costs of complying with the Aviation Directive would be required to ensure that devel oping countries do not incur a share of the costs that is higher than would be implied by the principle of CBDRRC. However, Müller accepts that this analysis relates only to the direct costs of purchasing at New York University School of Law on July 9, 2012 http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ as Japan, while its relative GDP is only 18 per cent. Malaysia produces around 88 per cent of the ETScovered emissions generated by Switzerland, with a GDP of around 45 per cent. Disparities of this kind are not confined to developed and develop ing country partnerships. The South African economy is around 20 per cent of the size of the Indian economy while its ETScovered emissions are almost half. The Thai economy is around 5 per cent of the size of the Chinese economy, but its ETS-covered emissions are onethird. In some circumstances the correlation between ETScovered emissions and GDP is closer or even good. However, the key point is that any correla tion is contingent and in no way written into the fabric of the scheme.
There is another argument contained in the final Impact Assessment which, although not framed in the language of CBDRRC, may be relevant to the discussion nonetheless. In assessing the social impacts of the proposal, the Impact Assessment points out that 'while the impacts of climate change tend to create most difficulties for people in poorer regions of the world, increased ticket prices resulting from the EU ETS will be predominantly borne by the wealthier segments of the population, both within the EU and globally'. 82 It is pointed out that flying is still the preserve of the welloff and that it is not credible to claim that higher ticket prices will hit poorest people the hardest.
Although not presented by the European Commission in these terms, this discussion brings to mind the concept of 'intranational common but differentiated responsibil ity'; a concept explored by Greenpeace India in a controversial report entitled 'Hiding Behind the Poor'. 83 This report argued that the significant carbon emissions of a rela tively small wealthy class in India are camouflaged by the vastly smaller emissions of the Indian poor. 84 While the report argues in favour of differentiation of responsibili ties between developed and developing countries, it also argues in favour of differen tiation of responsibilities between rich and poor people as well.
The EU seems to accept that at present CBDRRC is only concerned with the distribu tion of the climate burden between states. It does not seek to draw a link between its observations on the social impacts of the Aviation Directive and CBDRRC, or to argue in favour of a unilateral redrawing of the boundaries of this principle. For this reason, we make just one remark.
allowances, and does not reflect the total impact of including aviation in the ETS on developing country economies (ibid., at 13). While his analysis is very valuable, it does not alter the basic fact that because the EU does not accept that CBDRRC is relevant in this setting, no mechanism is in place to evaluate the compatibility of the Aviation Dir. with this principle or to design/adjust the functioning of the system to ensure respect. 82 Final Impact Assessment, supra note 59, at 36. EJIL 23 (2012), Any claim that a climate mitigation measure may be justified on the basis that it is the global rich and not the poor who will be required to pay needs to be based on clear evidence, and the impact of the measure needs to be monitored in order to assess its distributive effects. The EU's Impact Assessment is far from being a benchmark for good practice in this respect.
The Impact Assessment acknowledges that there is limited data on the socio economic distribution of air transport users. 85 It then extrapolates its conclusions from data from the United Kingdom and from the fact that 'far less than 5-10% of the world's inhabitants use air transport at least once per year'. 86 It does not examine the socioeconomic distribution of air transport users in developing countries.
It is also the case that there is little consideration given to the development impact of including air freight in the EU ETS. The preliminary Impact Assessment stressed that air freight tends to comprise high values goods, 'the consumption of which can be assumed to be relatively greater in higher income classes than in lower income classes'. 87 Nonetheless, the Impact Assessment stops short of assessing the price sensitivity of consumer markets for airfreighted goods or the potential for the Aviation Directive to reduce the development benefits of carrying goods by air, including in relation to the prominent example of developing country (especially African) horti cultural trade. 88 Other studies have recognized that import substitution may occur as a result of increasing transportation costs in respect of imports.
89 While it may not be possible to estimate quantitatively the impact of the Aviation Directive on trade, it has been suggested that small island developing states and landlocked countries may be among those most vulnerable to its effects. 90 This at least highlights the possibility that while the costs of the Aviation Directive will be borne predominantly by the rich, the global poor may suffer negative impacts as well; a possibility that the various impact assessments do not refute.
While the European Commission expresses a commitment to monitor airline ticket prices to ensure that price increases are not disproportionate to the costs of airlines 85 Final Impact Assessment, supra note 59, at 35. 86 Ibid., at 36. 87 Ibid., at 14. ICAO estimates that $100 spent on air transport produces benefits worth $325 for the econ omy and 100 additional jobs in air transport result in 610 new economy wide jobs, as cited in 'Strategic Plan: 2010-2015', Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India, New Delhi, available at: http://civila viation.gov.in/cs/groups/public/documents/newsandupdates/moca_000783.pdf, at 2 (accessed 24 Feb. 2012).
at New York University School of Law on July 9, 2012 http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ participating in the ETS, 91 it makes no commitment to monitor the impact of the Aviation Directive on the world's vulnerable and poor or, where necessary, to take cor rective steps.
C What Steps Should the EU Take to Ensure Respect for the Principle of CBDRRC?
We propose two amendments to the EU's Aviation Directive in order to ensure respect for the principle of CBDRRC.
92 Each of these proposals calls, in different ways, for the differential treatment of developing country flights. It is therefore necessary at the outset to define which countries are to count as developing countries and which flights are to count as developing country flights.
Turning first to the question of which countries should be considered developing countries, the FCCC includes a list of developed country parties and economies in transition in Annex I. Conceived as a means to distinguish between developed and developing country parties, Annex I gives rise to some anomalies. Indeed, it excludes some of the richest countries in the world. 93 Notwithstanding these anomalies, we propose that in taking steps to reform the Aviation Directive the EU should treat all nonAnnex I countries as developing countries. 94 While this may seem counter intuitive, it is reasonable to adopt this stance because of the nature and implications of the two reform proposals we set out below. As will become clear, these pro posals are inherently capable of responding to the profound differences in the levels of development of the individual countries that make up the broad developing country group.
Turning to the question of which flights should be considered as developing coun try flights, while no 'system boundary' for international aviation emissions has been agreed on a multilateral basis, a system boundary has been established by the EU's Aviation Directive nonetheless. As was already explored, this draws a defini tive link between the EU and international aviation emissions that are generated by EU-departing flights. On the contrary, the directive draws a merely provisional link between the EU and international aviation emissions that are generated by thirdcountry departing flights. For thirdcountry departing flights, inclusion in the ETS is contingent upon the third country in question not having taken EUapproved mea sures to reduce the climate impact of these flights. In the light of this, the system boundary established by the Aviation Directive is departurebased. It is the country 91 Final Impact Assessment, supra note 59, at 36. 92 As will become clear, we are not proposing the a priori exclusion of developing country flights from the ETS. Nor are we proposing that developing country airlines be accorded more generous access to Clean Development Mechanism Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). The current limits on access for the aviation sector are set out in Art. 11a and especially Art. 11a(8). This provides that the overall use of credits shall not exceed 50% of the Communitywide reductions below the 2005 levels of new sectors and aviation over the period from the date of their inclusion in the Community scheme to 2020. 93 Such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Brunei, Singapore, and Qatar which are among the top 20 richest countries in the world, and Mexico, South Korea, and Chile which are members of the OECD. 94 Needless to say, the EU should take account of any amendments to the relevant Annexes. E.g., Malta has recently been added to the list of Annex I countries as a result of its accession to the EU.
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EJIL 23 (2012), from which a flight departs that has responsibility for the emissions generated during this flight. It is only when the departure state fails to accept responsibility that the arrival state will step in. On this basis, we argue that all flights departing from devel oping countries should be viewed as developing country flights. It is consequently the point of departure of a flight rather than the nationality of the airline that should be determinative in this respect. Our first proposal designed to ensure that the EU's Aviation Directive respects the principle of CBDRRC calls upon the EU to differentiate between countries in terms of the conditions that apply for gaining exemption from the ETS. Differentiation of this kind could be reflected in the terms of an international agreement on reducing emis sions from the aviation sector negotiated under the auspices of ICAO. 95 For example, a different timetable for the progressive achievement of emission reductions could be put in place for flights that depart from different states.
In the absence of international agreement, in order to benefit from an exemption third countries are required to take measures to reduce the climate change impact of flights. We propose that different countries should be required to make different emis sions reduction commitments; and that the EU should differentiate not only between developed and developing country blocs, but between individual developing coun tries as well. Developed countries, such as Canada and the United States, should be required to adopt measures to reduce the climate change impact of flights that are at least equivalent in terms of their environmental effect to those of the EU. Developing countries, by contrast, should be required to adopt measures to reduce the climate change impact of flights that are commensurate with their respective responsibilities and capabilities.
It would fall to the EU to elaborate precise criteria to assess the responsibility and capability of an individual developing country, and to define the level of attainment that their aviationfocused climate mitigation measures must achieve in order to gain exemption. In order to reduce the administrative burden associated with differentia tion of this kind, the selected criteria must be capable of being applied on the basis of data that are accessible and reliable. A country's responsibilities could, for example, be assessed by reference to current and historic emissions, while a country's capabilities could be evaluated by reference to per capita GDP. 96 Needless to say, the selection of the applicable objective criteria will necessarily be a subjective and controversial exercise. For example, the selection of an appropriate 95 Recall that Art. 25a(2) of Dir. 2003/87 (supra note 2) provides that if agreement on global measures to reduce international aviation emissions is achieved, the Commission shall consider whether amend ments to the Aviation Directive are required. The Commission could decide to exempt those signing up to this agreement from inclusion in the ETS. 96 Emphasis upon the capability limb of CBDRRC is also a reflection of the fact that Art. 4(7) of the FCCC recognizes that poverty eradication and socioeconomic development are overriding priorities for devel oping countries. The World Bank classifies countries according to income group. The groups are: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975; upper middle income, $3,976-$12,275; and high income, $12,276 or more. The classifications are updated on 1 July each year. These classifica tions could be useful in reducing the complexity of differentiation of this kind.
at New York University School of Law on July 9, 2012 http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ cutoff date for determining responsibilities for historic emissions -whether from the industrial revolution or from 1990 when the FCCC was negotiated -is a subjective and political exercise. 97 However, if a suitably wide set of representative criteria are chosen in relation to responsibility and capability, drawn, inter alia, from those cri teria suggested by parties in the ongoing climate negotiations, 98 these may find greater acceptance. The advantage of an approach built on a representative set of objective criteria is that the most advanced developing countries would incur a climate mit igation burden which is close or equal to that of the EU. To take just one example, Singapore is a nonAnnex I party under the FCCC. Nonetheless, on a per capita basis, its historic emissions in 1980 were higher than those of the EU, 99 its current emis sions are higher than those of the EU, and its GDP significantly outstrips that of the EU. Consequently, on this basis, measures adopted by Singapore to reduce the climate change impact of flights could be expected to achieve an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of the EU. China by contrast had, on a per capita basis, vastly lower historic emissions in 1980 compared with the EU, has significantly lower per capita emissions today, and compared with the EU, China has a relatively modest per capita GDP. Giving equal weighting to these three criteria, China's mitigation burden would (in percentage terms) be around onethird of that of the EU.
A proposal of this kind would not give rise to 'national treatment' type discrimi nation, 100 because it would not treat EU airlines more favourably than airlines from other states. For example, all airlines flying from Delhi to the EU would be treated in exactly the same way. This is an important consideration, both from the point of view It is also salient to observe that 'ICAO has in practice taken a flexible approach' when it comes to the differential treatment of developed and developing states. 108 ICAO's Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of International Air Transport contains an Appendix that sets out the kind of preferential measures that may be taken in favour of developing countries. 109 ICAO's aircraft noise regulations seek to accommodate the needs of developing countries by giving them more time to comply with the relevant obligations and by providing that the special circumstances of developing country airlines are to be taken into account, for example through the provision of timelimited economic hardship exemptions. 110 And it is fascinating to see that in a jointly prepared study, ICAO and the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) reached a broad conclusion on differentiation which is not unlike that of the Appellate Body of the WTO. It concludes that special treatment must be justified by a welldefined purpose, by reference to transparent and objective cri teria, and should not entail discrimination among airlines. 111 In order to achieve this, and consistency with the Chicago Convention, a routebased approach rather than a nationalitybased approach to differentiation should be preferred. 112 Our first proposal would also raise questions of legality in EU law. Nonetheless, we would argue that even if the equivalence criterion is to be applied by the EU in assess ing third country eligibility for exemption from the ETS, 113 this concept should be read in the light of the principle of CBDRRC. For developing countries equivalence should be understood as a relative concept, and a developing country's mitigation burden should be calculated by reference to its relative responsibilities and capabilities. For a poor country's climate mitigation measures to be considered as equivalent in terms of their environmental effect to those of a rich country, a smaller absolute contribution should be required. This is in keeping with the idea that the equal treatment of coun tries that are differently situated according to accepted criteria may necessitate formal differences in the treatment that they receive. 114 Of course, if our relativist reading of 492 EJIL 23 (2012), 469-494 the concept of equivalence were to be deemed unconvincing by the CJEU, an amend ment to the directive's preamble would be required. Our second proposal to enhance respect for CBDRRC is more straightforward, and less controversial. 115 We consider that it would be appropriate for the revenues raised as a result of the inclusion of developing country flights in the ETS to be committed to a global climate fund, 116 and for these revenues to be used to finance climate mitiga tion and adaptation activities in developing countries. 117 By taking a broad conception of what is to count as a developing country and of the concept of a developing country flight, a greater proportion of aviationETS revenues would be committed as expendi ture in developing countries in this way. Notice what we are not proposing here. We are not arguing that revenues should be repatriated to the developing country from which the specific flight departs. 118 On the contrary, we are arguing that all revenues derived from all developing country flights should be committed to a global fund and should be distributed to developing countries in accordance with the governance arrangements and the funding criteria that the fund in question has put in place. 115 We will frame our proposal narrowly in a bid to overcome political objections to the general idea of requir ing ETS revenues to be used to tackle climate change. However, we would favour broader hypothecation of ETSgenerated revenues to tackle climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The current Emissions Trading Directive provides that it is for Member States to deter mine how the revenues derived from auctioning allowances are to be used. 119 By con trast to the Commission's more emphatic proposal, it states merely that these revenues should be used to tackle climate change, in both the EU and developing countries. 120 Our proposal differs from this in three crucial ways. First, according to our proposal, hypo thecation of revenues would be required. Secondly, our proposal is limited to those rev enues which accrue as a result of the inclusion of aviation in the ETS and the inclusion of developing country flights. This is because it is driven by the principle of CBDRRC, and by the concept of nonet incidence for developing countries that this is increasingly thought to entail. 121 Thirdly, the exclusive focus of our proposal is on the funding of mit igation and adaptation activities that are situated in developing countries. It has been suggested that it is not appropriate for the EU to determine national public expenditure allocations, and that for it to do so would be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. 122 We would argue that our more narrowly tailored proposal is capable of overcoming this subsidiarity objection, because it is necessary to ensure respect for a principle (CBDRRC) that has already been endorsed by both the EU and its Member States.
Conclusion
The EU is engaged in an ambitious strategy of contingent unilateralism. This is most apparent in its decision to include aviation in its ETS. This strategy extends the global reach of EU climate change law and seeks to use the EU's market share as a means to stimulate climate action, globally and on the part of individual states. Although the EU's Aviation Directive has the potential to cover more than half of the world's inter national aviation emissions, it is based on the principle of equal treatment and the EU argues that the principle of CBDRRC does not apply. This highlights a crucial question concerning the distribution of the mitigation burden arising from unilateral action on climate change. 123 We have argued that the principle of CBDRRC should retain 119 Art. 3d(4) of the consolidated version of Dir. 2003/87, supra note 2. 120 For the Commission's original proposal see COM(2006)818 final. Art. 3c(4) states that the revenues shall be used to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change, to fund research and development for mitigation and adaptation, and to cover the costs incurred by Member States in administering the scheme. The European Parliament also favoured hypothecation of revenues, and it placed special emphasis upon the financing of activities in developing countries. It was the Council, reportedly at the behest of the UK government, that insisted upon weakening the commitment to hypoth ecation, a matter in relation to which the Commission expressed its regret. 121 Supra note 58. 122 Ares, 'EU ETS and Aviation' (13 Feb. 2012), available at: www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/SN05533. pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2012). 123 For a good, more abstract, discussion see Eckersley, 'The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures', 24 Ethics and International Affairs (2010) 367. Our focus in this article is upon the distribution as between states because this is the concern raised by CBDRRC. We are sympathetic to the EU's argument that the burden of including aviation in the ETS will fall predominantly on rich people, regardless of whether they live in a rich or poor country, and we recognize that it would have been open to the EU to try to link this argument to a reformed understanding of CBDRRC. However, the EU did not seek to make this link and, as we previously observed, the analysis of the social impact of the Aviation Directive included in the Final Impact Assessment (supra note 59, at 35-36) was quite thin.
